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Abstract: This paper is based on field experience in the tundra camp of a reindeer-herding brigade with mixed ethnic back-
ground (Komi, Sami, Nenets, Russians) belonging to the ex-Sovkhoz of Krasnoschelie. Its purpose is to situate the new 
critical issues facing the reindeer-herding collectives after the economic collapse in Russia in 1998. My main argument 
is that the increasing economic isolation of the tundra periphery forces the herders to redefine their relationship with both 
the centre(s) and the other tundra actors. Reindeer herding on the Kola Peninsula is analysed in relation to its heteroge¬
neous economic system defined by the old Sovkhoz-like management and the new Western buyer of reindeer meat. 
Furthermore, the social environment in the herding territories has changed since the deterioration of the central planning 
economy, implying new renewable resources' users. After massive loss of jobs, militaries, miners and geologists came into 
the tundra for substantial hunting and fishing and so became actors in the local informal economy. Finally, tundra-locat¬
ed herders and hunters seem to be somewhere unified by a discourse against the town-based administrative power and 
economic actors such as mining industry. Therefore herders have to deal with both an old administrative system in the 
agrocentre and new realities in the tundra. Based on a case study of herding/hunting activities in a tundra camp, the paper 
analyses the social relationships between the different actors in the post-Soviet Kola tundra and express their quest for 
solutions. 
Key words: bazi (tundra camps), brigades (crews, collectives), informal economy, participant observation, periphery, 
Sovkhoz, syncretism. 
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Introduction 
The sharp deterioration of the Russian economy in 
1998 has strongly affected the northern periphery. 
The aim of my fieldwork was to share experience 
with tundra actors in the given economic crisis and 
to look, from a 'tundra perspective', after the current 
social dynamics in the post-Soviet North. More 
specifically my concern is how the economic rela¬
tionships in the very periphery are redefined in 
response to centre's pressures. This paper follows a 
ten weeks fieldwork conducted during the spring 
1999, mainly at the reindeer herding camp No. 1, 
belonging to the former state farm Pamyaf Lenina 
('Memory of Lenin'). During Soviet rule, the tradi-
tional reindeer husbandry was reorganised into col-
lective farms (kolkhoz) and later into state farms 
(sovkhoz). Created in 1921 in the village of 
Krasnoschelie, the Kolkhoz has progressively formed 
what will be later called 'agrocentre'. Classed as per-
spectivnoe ('with good prospects')1 the village of 
Krasnoschelie became a local agrocentre after the 
fusion with two other kolkhoz' (Ponoy and Sosnovka) 
in 1962. Then the improved Kolkhoz was renamed 
Pamyaf Lenina . It was transformed into a state farm 
(sovkhoz) in 1971. In terms of reindeer husbandry, 
Pamyaf Lenina has been the second biggest state 
farm after the sovkhoz 'Tundra' in Lovozero. It con-
sists of four operating brigades with 10 herders each 
1 See Palloit (1990: 665) about the methodology of classification. 
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Fig. 1. Natural and social environment for the reindeer herding in the Kola Peninsula. 
The two reindeer-herding farms are located in Lovozero ("Tundra", majority Sami) and in Krasnoschelie 
("Olenevod", with units in Kanevka and Sosnovka, majority Komi). The South-North oriented railway through 
Kandalaksha to Murmansk has been the artery providing labor power from South for the 1930s industrializa¬
tion. Nowadays it divides the peninsula into a heavy industrialized urban West and a low-populated pastoral 
East. Furthermore, the reindeer-herding camps, situated North from Krasnoschelie and North-East from 
Lovozero are surrounded by Northern Fleet military bases, towns and complex from the coastal North-East: 
Gremikha military town relies on Iokanga River2 as does Krasnoschelie's tundra camp No. 1. Westward 
beyond the national border, Scandinavian investors create market expectations in the still centralized Farm 
Administrations. 
one and nearly 20 000 reindeer (new data 2002). The 
'Tundra' state farm was reported to include 25 000 
reindeer in 2001 (Jernsletten & Klokov, 2002). Both 
state farms are situated in the eastern part of the 
peninsula, encompassing nearly the entire tundra 
region of Kola, administratively defined as Lovozero 
District. 
The tundra camp of brigade No. 1 is located on 
the Iokanga river 350 km away from the municipal 
centre Lovozero. Its economic centre, though, is in 
Krasnoschelie, which, despite of the status of 'agro-
centre' is in fact a remote village not connected to 
the road system of the peninsula. The social environ-
ment of the reindeer herders has definitively changed 
after president Yeltsine and prime minister Chubais 
started reforms on privatisation (Zakon "O privati-
zatzii gosudarstviennyh i munitzipial'nyh predpriiatiy v 
RSFSR", 1991). In this paper I argue that the eco-
nomic crisis during the transition in Russia is invest¬
ing the geographical isolation of the tundra regions 
2 Fore more detailed maps on military bases, see Skorve, 1991: map 8; Ries & Skorve, 1987: 47. 
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Table 1. Economic and social relationships between the main actors in the agrocentre and the tundra. The paper focus-

























other tundra actors 
into a syncretic network of heterogeneous economic 
models which relates the reindeer herding brigade as 
a 'convergence point'. Indeed, the tundra-camped 
brigade has to manage both its inherited Soviet-like 
relationship with the centre(s) and its informal deals 
with the new tundra actors. The main actors in the 
agrocentre and the tundra are depicted in Table 1. 
As for the ethnic landscape, there is a great deal of 
ethnic variety in the brigades with no clear distinc¬
tion, due to the many mixed marriages and the 
industrial migration from the south in Soviet times. 
However, one could say that the Sami represent the 
majority in "Tundra" sovkhoz brigades, whereas the 
Komi are predominant in "Pamyaf Lenina" herding 
collectives. The Nenets, though, are represented in 
all the brigades, as well as Russians descendants of 
the 1930s labour migrants. Brigade No. 1 of 
Krasnoschelie consists of ten herders including six 
Komis, two Nenets, one Sami and one young 
Russian herder. The chief brigadier and his deputy 
are Komi brothers. 
According to the Soviet organisation of the rein¬
deer herding, the brigade consists of ten herders and 
two female chum-rabotnitsi (tent helpers), usually rel¬
atives (wives) to some of the brigade's herders. A par¬
ticularity of Krasnoschelie's herding brigades is the 
lack of female tent workers after 1991. This is not 
the case in Lovozero's tundra camps, nor to other 
herding brigades in the Russian north. Comparing 
to Lovozero, Krasnoschelie is a very remote settle¬
ment, cut from all communication system, with a 
poorer farm as unique economic actor. Its herding 
camps are too far from either the village and the 
slaughter house near Lovozero. May be the geo¬
graphic isolation and the absence of cash for the tun-
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dra workers are the main reasons why the herder's 
wives don't work in the tundra camps. This is the 
case in Brigade No. 1 where a former construction 
worker from the sovkhoz has been working as a tent 
helper ('polar) since 1993 when the chief-brigadier 
asked him to join the brigade. At 53, he is the old¬
est in the brigade and uncle to one of the herders. 
His ethnic history could be representative of the cur¬
rent identity issues, although these are not the sub¬
ject of this paper. He is the descendant of a great and 
famous Nenets family of reindeer herders from 
Yamal (Nenetskiy okrug, north-west Siberia). They 
came to the Kola peninsula during the great Komi-
Nenets migration in late 19th century when a disas¬
trous epidemic was killing the reindeer herds in 
north-west Siberia. His father was a herder and 
owner of 300 animals expropriated during the Soviet 
'collectivisation campaign' in the north in the 1930s. 
His mother was tent helper and artist of traditional 
Nenets herder's clothes represented at exhibitions in 
Moscow. He married a Komi girl from Krasnoschelie 
and they had four children. Despite his well-known 
Nenets family and his marriage with a Komi 
woman, his passport says that he is ... Sami. He has 
never explained this point to me but as described 
also by Konstantinov (1996: 54), ethnicity in the 
region is "to a large extent self-ascribed and arbi-
trary". 
Methods and approach 
The anthropological participant observation 
(Spradley, 1980; Jorgensen, 1989) represents the 
main method of this fieldwork. It was carried out 
directly with the reindeer-herding crews (brigadi) at 
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the tundra-camps (bazi). My field experience started 
at the beginning of May 1999 in tundra camp No. 1 
of the Krasnoschelie farm. Apart from the nine 
herders and the tent helper, there were two Russian 
hunters in the base. In my daily tasks I mainly assist¬
ed the tent helper but participated also in the daily 
herding and fishing activities with the brigade as 
well as in several 48 hours hunts with the hunters. 
At the beginning of June the brigade left the tundra 
camp for the village3. Then I moved down the 
Iokanga River with the hunters. We stayed for hunt¬
ing and fishing until the end of June in an area situ¬
ated between the pasture of the mixed reindeer herd 
No. 4 and No. 5 and the closed to all but authorised 
personnel military town of Gremikha4. 
As my fieldwork is exclusively centred on my 
meeting with these tundra actors, self-reflectivity 
takes a decisive part in my methods. Somehow, my 
location in the tundra has defined my researcher's 
perspective. A l l I could see from the reindeer-herd¬
ing camp relates to two perception's dimensions: on 
the one hand the sovkhoz which transcends the tun¬
dra, on the other hand these 'boys with guns' 
(hunters, poachers, military) who are in the tundra. 
Being at the same time with both the herders and 
the hunters in the tundra camp, I was also a 'point of 
convergence' of those heterogeneous realities. Some¬
times with a gun, sometimes with a sleigh, I was 
continuously in both the sovkhoz' discourse and the 
phenomenology of the tundra deals. Consequently, 
my 'research' is only centred on these relationships 
involving the tundra camp: the one between the 
brigade and the sovkhoz, the other between herders 
and hunters. 
This paper is thus based on field notes usually 
taken during our daily activities in the tundra camp 
(mostly feeding the transport animals, making and 
preparing the sledges, searching and stocking wood, 
hunting; fishing in June) or during group discus-
sions5. No formal interviews were done during the 
field-work. Only informal talks and mostly oral his¬
tory was taken into account; a few written texts were 
consulted. 
Meeting the hunters was a chance for my field-
work. Especially so, since there is quite few studies 
regarding the informal post-sovkhoz relations 
between the tundra actors in the Russian north. The 
very stimulating "Hunters, herders, and heavy met¬
als in arctic Siberia" (Anderson, 1995) analyses a 
similar situation in what concerns the vertical rela¬
tionships between the brigade and the agrocentre 
(Khantaiskii state farm in his case, Krasnoschelie 
state farm in ours) as well as to the urbanised indus¬
trial centre (Norilsk metallurgical complex in his 
case, 'Lovozero ore mining and processing enterprise' 
in Revda in ours). As for the hunters, however, there 
is a radical difference between the two cases: hunters 
in Anderson's paper belong to the state farm and so 
have more "institutionalised" relationship to the 
herders. Hunters and fishermen nearby of the 
Iokanga river have nothing to do with the state 
farm. They come from the town and not from the 
village as do the herders, belong to urban social net¬
works, and are non-professional hunters. In our case, 
one of the hunters used to be miner, the other has 
worked in the metallurgical plant in Revda, then as 
driver in the local milice (the police office). This 
said, in a context of either long-term unemployment 
or unwillingness to return to an underpaid job, 
which is the case of the former miner, the tendency 
is to become professional hunter. Because of these 
features, I was interested in following the hunters 
after the departure of the brigade No. 1 to the vil¬
lage. 
Issues 
The present situation in the tundra of Kola 
Peninsula is being determined by the intertwined 
interests of a few pairs of actors: 
1. Reindeer herding brigades in relation to the 
sovkhoz administration; 
2. Herders in relation to hunters and other inde¬
pendent tundra actors; 
3. A l l of the above, exploiting renewable resources, 
versus the town-based industries in the Kola, 
exploiting non-renewable resources (such as 
underground ores). 
In my view all of these three relationships are 
interdependent and it is impossible for each one of 
them to be understood without understanding the 
influences of the others. 
Memory of Sovkhoz 
In 1994, the sovkhoz officially ended as a state eco-
3 Since the crisis in the central planning Sovkhoz management, brigades progressively have abandoned the year-round herding. The herd is now left alone 
from mid-June to the slaughter campaign in October (volny vypus', in Russian). This type of herding is close to the traditional Sami herding. 
4 Situated at the Iokanga's estuary on the Barents' coast, Gremikha is part of the large network of closed military towns on the Kola peninsula. See Honneland 
& Jorgensen (1999) for details and statistics. 
5 In some way, these group discussions have been provoked by the process of taking notes itself. As usually happens with anthropologists living for a while 
in local communites (Stocking, 1983), I was myself object of interest for them, and especially while writing. This interest was very stimulating because it 
generated a real informal, and informative, exchange. 
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nomic unit and the "Memory of Lenin" became 
Tovarishestvo s Ogranichennoy Otvetstvennost'yu', a kind 
of Ltd. company through the so-called "insider pri-
vatisation" by the "Workers'-and-managers' collec¬
tives". In this form of privatisation, managers and 
employees of the concerned state firm get the major¬
ity of the shares at a state-subsidised price (stressed 
also by Nikula, 1998: 155). "Memory of Lenin Ltd." 
is a representative product of that system. In late 
1998, it was formally transformed into a 'coopera¬
tive' named 'Olenevod ('Reindeer herder'). These 
name changes didn't imply structural ones in the 
economic relationship between the administrative 
centre situated in Krasnoschelie and the tundra col¬
lectives. 
This chapter discuss how the social meaning of the 
former state farm has been perpetuated into the new 
"private" form. One real change that herders feel in 
their relationship to the farm's administration is 
their lack of money and social security. It is however 
significant that they continue to call the Farm 'The 
Sovkhoz\ and so do I in this paper, emphasising an 
old model perpetuated in a new form. Hence, the 
brigade is still managed by a planning-economy 
relationship with the ex-Sovkhoz, and there are more 
than one planning: one for the kilograms of slaugh¬
tered meat, another for the number and the inner 
structure of the herd (percents of females, males, cas¬
trates, calves). A l l the reindeer meat is sold by the 
farm, which pay the herders mostly with products 
and services in the village (but not in the tundra 
camps): electricity, health care, children care, etc. 
Brigade workers are also supposed to receive salary, 
which happens less often during the last years. Here 
is a representative discussion with herders: 
" - It was much better before, of course (col¬
lective approval). 
- What was better ? (I asked). 
- There were salaries, regularly paid . . . and 
advances at the beginning of the month. We 
had paid vacancies, could go to the Sovkhoz' 
villas (recreational centres belonging to the 
Soviet 'professional unions'), you could trav-
el, go to the Black Sea, to Bulgaria6!. - Now, 
you can't go anywhere... You have no 
money... And they don't pay salaries any-
more, you live just on the advance ... What a 
bloody misery!" 
Economic and geographic isolation have rein-
forced each other since the deterioration of the Soviet 
economy and this created an anxious feeling of social 
insecurity among the tundra collectives. The periph-
ery feels abandoned by the centre(s). This context of 
isolation is reinforced by the lack of female workers 
in the tundra camps in the last years, so herders feel 
isolated from both the decision-makers and the fam¬
ily. The response to this is a stronger and valuable 
relation to the ex-Sovkhoz, the only conceivable 
source of security. Even the relation with the family 
pass through the Sovkhoz, as many of the herder's 
wives work in there and children go to the Sovkhoz' 
school or kindergarten. 
" - So when did the 'misery' begin ? I asked. 
- With this fucking perestroïka, you know... 
- With Gorbachev ? 
- No, later ... In 1990 ... (others:) - In 1991 
(the beginning of the privatisation of the 
Russian state farms). 
- How this changed things here, in the 
brigade ? 
- In no way. As it has ever been, so it is (This 
is a Komi proverb and was said in Komi, 
while all the discussion(s) was done in 
Russian) ... The only difference is that there's 
no money now... ". 
The main structural change operates indeed 
beyond the herder-administration relationship, as it 
concerns the relation of the farm to the buyer. After 
the 'privatisation', the state ceased to provide subsi¬
dies and a market for the reindeer meat. 
Consequently, the farm administration is left to find 
a market for its production, as well as to negotiate 
the deal with the buyer. Thus, beyond the substan¬
tial economic relationship of the brigades to the ex-
Sovkhoz, the private Buyer appears as a new eco¬
nomic actor in the tundra. The Swedish slaughter¬
house "Norfrys-Polarica" serves as the unique buyer of 
reindeer meat in the whole Peninsula. Located near 
Lovozero, it deserves both Lovozero' and 
Krasnoschelie' ex-Sovkhoz's. Paradoxically, this new, 
western, and private enterprise has not changed the 
economic relations between the herders and the 
Sovkhoz (Fig. 2). 
The herding collectives has no (economic) relation 
to the buyer. Preserving the crucial role of mediator, 
the Sovkhoz' administration continues to control the 
flow of goods between the Producer and the Buyer 
through a Soviet-like system of redistribution that 
6 Because I am originally from Bulgaria, herders did this d in d'oeil on the former vacancies on the Bulgarian sea coast, which was part of the international 
recreational infrastructure inside the Socialist Bloc. 
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Fig. 2. The economic relationships between the pro¬
ducer, the farm administration and the buyer in 
the current reindeer husbandry in Krasno-
schelie. Despite the "insider privatisation" in 
1994, the ex-Sovkhoz has perpetuated its mid¬
dleman's role between the reindeer herding 
brigades and the buyer of their production. 
Hence the brigades continue to relate to the 
farm in a "central-planning" fashion while the 
latter is in a market relationship with the 
Swedish buyer. The Sovkhoz redistributes 
goods, services and sometimes salaries to the 
brigades. 
is practically cash-free. Even more, the Western pri¬
vate buyer took some of the roles played before by 
the former State. Being in a monopoly situation, it 
provides at the same time a non-market economic 
'security' to the reindeer husbandry production, and 
through this, a precious social security to the tundra 
collectives. 
The brigade workers legitimise this system by 
refusing to become independent economic actors 
outside the Sovkhoz. The brigade is still the basic 
social unit for the reindeer herders in the Kola 
peninsula. After 'the privatisation' of the Sovkhoz, 
one can notice the increased solidarity within the 
herding collectives as a response to perceived threats, 
or abandonment, from the outside. From herders 
perspective, the brigade remains even the only imag¬
inable herding unit. As in some other regions of the 
Russian north (Fondahl, 1998), the anticipated ini¬
tiatives for private reindeer herding after the adop¬
tion of the law for the privatisation of the Russian 
state-owned enterprises (Zakon O privatizatzii gosu-
darstviennyh i munitzipial'nyh predpriiatiy v RSFSR, 
1991) did not happen. Brigade workers are reluctant 
to the idea of private herds sold directly to the buyer. 
Even they consider this project as "impossible". 
Almost each herder has indeed some 'private' ani-
20 
mals which are grazed together with the Sovkhoz' 
herd on the summer pasture. These 'private' reindeer 
are bred for subsistence only. They are very useful 
especially in the village, for both transport and meat. 
But there is no market-oriented private herding as 
well as there are no private owners. And this despite 
of the appearance of a private buyer and a kind of 
market. Herders don't look excited by the possibili¬
ty to sell own production to the buyer. They feel cer¬
tainly more secure being managed by a familiar 
middleman as the Sovkhoz and are not enthusiastic 
about any entrepreneurship. I looked strange with 
my 'fix-idea' of possible private herding, while initi¬
ating discussions again and again with the herders 
on this subject. I was making efforts to understand 
their point, so were they regarding my question. 
This makes me say that from the tundra perspective, 
the private herding is a hardly imaginable option in 
the region. The main reasons are social, indeed: 
1. "The Sovkhoz would not accept this." 
This statement express not just a power relation 
between the centre and the periphery. It also express 
a necessity of co-operation between the tundra camps 
and the village. The Sovkhoz is still the main and 
even the only economic actor in Krasnoschelie. 
According to the herders, "no Sovkhoz - no village". 
The Soviet concept of 'agrocentre' has been built 
on this concentration of all the rural economy in a 
big centre. Consequently, the Sovkhoz has been man¬
aging, controlling and securing all the activities in 
the village. Even after the significant "April decree" 
("On the programme for the social development of 
the village", Pravda, 1989), the key-role of the state 
farm in the village was perpetuated, as reported by 
Palloit (1990: 663) 
"Despite the enhanced role envisaged for 
regional and republic bodies in the develop¬
ment of collective and state farm villages, the 
April decree perpetuates the assumption 
made since the 1960s that these settlements 
are a farm's responsibility [...]" 
In this way the farm encompasses the social uni¬
verse of the village. Even habitants non employed by 
the farm "must rely on farm management for the 
provision of a whole range of services. [...] Reforms 
since 1960s have attempted to extend local authori¬
ty power in rural areas but farms have continued to 
exercise the decisive role in village development." 
(Palloit, 1990: 663). 
After the so-called "Chubais' privatisation" in 
1991, state farms on the Kola peninsula continued to 
exercise, with less cash, this decisive role. They were 
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financially abandoned by the state but enjoy support 
from both the village and the tundra brigades. The 
latter are socially connected to the Sovkhoz by their 
family and social networks: their relatives, friends 
and neighbours work there. This network of mutual 
support is hardly thinkable out of the centralized 
social institution. 
2. "You'd have big problems with the other herds." 
The second reason for the unwillingness to begin 
private herding is the complicated structure of the 
reindeer herds in the area. Contrary to other parts in 
the Russian north, the herds in this Sovkhoz' area are 
situated relatively close to each other, especially in 
the winter pastures. This makes them mix quite 
often , which is a constant problem in the tundra 
camps. The extensive reindeer husbandry practised 
during the Sovkhoz was based on the Komi principle 
of a year-round herding. Since 1990 it has being 
replaced by the practice of volny vypus' (leaving the 
herd on its own from June to October), which is 
close to the Sami pre-revolution model of husbandry. 
Since the brigades don't herd year-round, they mark 
less often their reindeer with the brigade's mark (in 
spring 1999, for instance, there wasn't any marking 
coral for the herd No. 1). In this way the herds 
economic & social support 
VILLAGE^ SOVKHOZ 
famililies\ / \ meat 
\ / \ for the 
meat for \ / \ market 
subsistence \ meat for/plan \ 
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Fig. 3. "Security environment" as seemed to be perceived by the reindeer herders. 
It emphasises the substantial links between the tundra-located brigade, 
the village-based administration and the village social network (rela¬
tives, friends, neighbours). This triangle acts as a "redistributive sys-
tem", the sovkhoz supporting both the brigades and the village. The 
figure shows one of the main reasons for the brigades to continue herd¬
ing the sovkhoz' herds instead of starting private herding and selling 
meat directly to the buyer. In their view, this scenario would deteriorate 
the social network in the village and would even threat the existence of 
the latter. 
increasingly fall out of the brigades' control and 
become mixed with neighbouring herds. Hence, 
when the reindeer populations get mixed, it is diffi¬
cult to separate "ours" from "the others". Historically, 
there are two different traditional approaches to deal 
with this situation. Until the end of the 19th centu¬
ry, Sami herders, who were leaving the herd on its 
own in the summer, were regulating this frequent 
problem by a kind of ethical code. Each owner find¬
ing 'foreigners' in his herd had to catch them and 
give them back to their herder. But this code 
changed after the arrival of the Komi at the end of 
the century. Practising the year-round herding, they 
tried to control permanently the herd. In terms of 
ethics, this resulted in the responsibility of each 
owner to take care for his herd. 'Immigrants' were 
considered as part of the herd. 
In some ways this conception is still acting nowa¬
days. The difference is that there is no private own¬
ership. Somehow "everybody is equal in the eyes of 
the Sovkhoz" so the migration of animals from one 
herd to another doesn't change the ownership. In 
this sense it is an administrative problem rather than 
a social one. Regarding the management of the herd, 
brigade workers deal with the village-based admin¬
istration accountancy through more or less abstract 
numbers; and not with other 
tundra actors. This is one more 
'security' point supporting the 
Sovkhoz. Herders consider their 
current situation as already 
exposed to too much risks to 
leave the farm and take alone 
the whole responsibility for the 
herd. A change in the owner¬
ship would totally change the 
present status. For example, the 
herd No. 1 of Krasnoschelie is 
now in contact with the herds 
No. 1 and No. 8 of Lovozero in 
the north and with the fourth 
herd of Krasnoschelie to the 
east (as well as with the already 
non-existent fifth herd, 50% of 
which disappeared mysterious-
ly 7 during the economic crisis in 
1998). So, if the herd No. 1 
become private, there would be 
serious problems with the 
(already mixed) neighbouring 
herds belonging to the Sovkhoz. 
This would create a tough deal 
7 There are contradictious rumors about loss, some of the herders said the animals were poached by military people. 
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between two actors with different status: Sovkhoz' 
workers and private owners. A situation like this 
could deteriorate the social network in the both tun¬
dra camps and village. Furthermore, it would threat 
the social structure because one would get cash but 
not access to the services, while the other will con¬
tinue to work underpaid but with access to the 
Sovkhoz' services, products and network. So this 
potential 'social differentiation', or rather social 'dis¬
integration' is perceived as the worst scenario. The 
Sovkhoz, as a unique owner, is a warranty against 
such kind of social insecurity. 
3. "You cannot cope yourself with this." 
There is neither adequate infrastructure nor eco¬
nomic environment to develop private herding. A 
private herder could not rely on any help from the 
so-far existing institutions, neither formal (adminis¬
tration, brigades, municipality) nor informal (net¬
works). Unlike the herders from Lovozero, brigades 
from Krasnoschelie are situated too far from the 
Swedish slaughterhouse, so they have even less phys¬
ical possibility to direct access to the buyer. A l l of 
this makes them highly dependant on the Sovkhoz as 
mediator. The case of Sosnovka, another remote vil-
lage in the area of "Pamyat Lenina" Sovkhoz, has 
been often reported as an example during our dis¬
cussions in the camp. One brigade there tried to 
begin private herding. The next year "those guys 
returned with awful shame to the Sovkhoz, begging 
the administration to forgive them and to accept 
them again". 
Nikula (1998: 157) stresses the specific non-mar¬
ket relationship between managers and workers in 
the Russian 'insider privatisation': 
Managers are not interested in ownership as 
such, but they are interested in maintaining 
their power to control the distribution of 
profits and benefits. Workers are also not so 
much interested in ownership, but care more 
about economic gains and secure employ¬
ment. 
Based on the above, one may argue that the struc¬
ture of the insider privatised 'Memory of Lenin' is 
significantly charged with the memory of the Soviet 
economic system8. Fig. 3 shows the "security envi-
ronment" seen from the reindeer herders. 
Survival after the Sovkhoz: Herders and hunters 
in the tundra 
Against the formal vertical relationship with the vil-
lage-centred administration, herders raise informal 
types of horizontal relations with other tundra 
actors, such as hunters, militaries or geologists. The 
reindeer herding brigades hardly do any hunting. 
When a need arises, they kill a reindeer from the 
herd for meat. A majority of the hunters are poach¬
ers who come from the industrialised or military 
towns. Propelled in the tundra by the changing 
social context, these new actors have rapidly taken 
place and provoked a reinterpretation of the tradi¬
tional social relationships. Arriving either on tracked 
vehicles or on snowmobile (usually in its Russian 
version, Buran), they are the guys who recreate post¬
Soviet tundra's connection with the town. Contrary 
to my expectations, I witnessed hunters and herders 
working together and helping each other after been 
"abandoned by the State" according to their expres¬
sion. Their collaboration took the form of a series of 
informal negotiations and barter deals. 
Herders sheltered hunters in the camp while 
hunters were helping herders with their tracked 
vehicle, especially precious for collecting wood. They 
also used it while returning to the village - because 
in a lack of vehicles, the Farm sent just one vehicle 
to assist the return of several brigades. The meeting 
point was the traditional winter camp (pogozd) of 
Semyostrovie, situated between the Iokanga camp 
and the village of Krasnoshchelie. Hence, the herd¬
ing brigade No. 1 joined Semyostrovie with the 
vehicle offered by the hunters. 
Following this implied agreement with the 
herders, and maybe because of a "researcher's" pres¬
ence in "witness" position, the hunters never shut 
reindeer during my stay, even after we moved from 
the tundra camp in June. Before the thaw of the 
Iokanga river at the beginning of June, they were 
hunting mostly geese and ducks, and preparing for 
the fishing season, especially for the June's salmon 
fishing. During our stay near the area of the brigade 
No. 4 and No. 5 (called "brigade 45" by the herders), 
they managed also to kill one elk (moose, Alces alces), 
which was their only poaching apart of the salmon 
fishing (the legal season to hunt elks and fish salmon 
is from September 1 to November 15). Their dream 
"to meet the bear" failed unrealised. 
Hunters bring meat back to the town for various 
subsistence purposes. Meat is used mostly to feed the 
hunter's families; then it is redistributed to the 
informal network of relatives, friends and neigh¬
bours. Finally, it is given to local key-employees 
against some services (such as having access to mili¬
tary vehicle, obtaining easier hunting permits, for 
the direction of the school their children go, etc.). In 
8 The title of the article 'Memory of Lenin Ltd.' (Konstantinov, 1997) express in my view the same idea. 
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any case they don't sale the meat (there is no market) 
and so participate in the dominant cash-less econo¬
my of the tundra region. 
During our daily discussions hunters have been 
expressing a strong desire to escape the industri¬
alised town unable to provide them "a normal liv¬
ing". One of them had worked for 19 years as a coal 
miner in the town of Revda. "There, you are in the 
very 'system of Mendeleiev': Cobalt, Radium, 
Uranium, heavy water...". One year before reaching 
retirement age he had left the mine to devote him¬
self to a hunting life in the tundra. The following 
discussion was done while we two were salting the 
first 60 kilograms of fish caught by our nets in the 
semi-thrown Iokanga river on May 27, 1999: 
" - My brother is a great hunter. Look at 
this... I have this knife from him. He has 
made it himself. Look at this, the handle is 
made from birch, so your hand doesn't freeze 
in winter. Hey, try it (to clean the fish), give 
me your silly knife, yours is for herding, not 
for fishing... See the difference?... 
- Do you have other brothers? 
- I have three of them. But the two others 
don't hunt often. They work in the mine. I 
have also a sister, in Chelyabinsk, our mother 
left an apartment there for us but I have 
nothing to do in the town. There is no job, no 
food, no freedom. What can I do in the fuck¬
ing town? To stay on the little balcony (na 
balkonchike) and admire it? Or maybe to angle 
those chemical fish at the little river? ... No, 
I can't imagine to live without the tundra. 
Tundra is everything for me, you know... 
Food, freedom ... There is nothing of this in 
the town, just radioactivity, the system of 
Mendeleiev (sist'ema Mendel'eeva) ..." 
The other hunter, 40, born in Byelorussia, is still 
working as driver in Revda but "can't food the fam¬
ily with one salary". His wife, daughter of a Komi 
reindeer herder who has been chief-brigadier of 
Krasnoschelie brigade No. 4, is unemployed. They 
have four children, three of them go to school, the 
youngest is one year old. "If I don't go hunt and fish 
in the tundra, we'd eat nothing but this (showing 
our dry 'soldier's bread'). In the tundra, I am depend¬
ing of no one but myself". 
This is the way town hunters live the wilderness 
paradigm which leads them to the tundra camp. 
After 1991, escaping to the wilderness quickly 
evolved and became a reality for the both town pop¬
ulation and tundra reindeer husbandry. Military, 
geologists and miners from the town lost their jobs 
Rangifer, Special Issue No. 13, 2002 
and were forced to reorient themselves towards 
accessing the resources of the tundra in order to 
make a living (Honneland & Jorgensen, 1999). 
According to their own definition, they are follow¬
ing "the call of the wild" and for them this is a kind 
of survival strategy. 
However, the situation is different regarding the 
military staff neighbouring the reindeer pastures. 
Although isolated from the centre and in lack of 
money since the post Cold War reforms in the 
Russian army, the military bases on the eastern Kola 
inherited good internal infrastructure and equip¬
ment. In the informal economy of the tundra, this 
enables them to provide services and goods for barter 
deals. In this context reindeer herders have often to 
deal with militaries. As mentioned above, the latter 
cause sometimes serious poaching problems, but the 
relationship with the herders in general is not an 
antagonistic one. Beyond the practical reasons for 
establishing good relations with the militaries, 
herders have in my view also a kind of 'sentimental' 
reasons for this. In the first chapter I mentioned the 
impact of the 'syndrome of isolation' on the herders' 
"quest for security". The idea of overcoming the geo¬
graphic and social isolation has also been many times 
expressed through the herders' 'individual military 
story'. Each of the nine herders in the tundra camp 
No. 1 has done his military service for at least three 
years in the Soviet army, so everyone told me his mil¬
itary story. Since I also did my military service in an 
army of the Warsaw pact and I did not appreciate it 
too highly, I was surprised by the very positive way 
my brigade mates were talking about their military 
experience. The idea behind these stories was 'escap¬
ing the isolation', travel to the south and living with 
other people. Two of the brigade had been soldiers 
abroad, in the Soviet bases in East Germany, so they 
were the most nostalgic about the years spent in the 
army. The army, as the Sovkhoz, have been meant to 
provide both social security and social network, as 
well as one's feeling to "participate in the real 
world", which is "go to the centre" (Sabev, 2002: 35¬
36). Somehow the Memory of the army has joined 
the Memory of the Sovkhoz. 
This perception has certainly impacted on the 
herder-military relationships in the tundra. Today, 
the main poaching problems come from the military. 
Herders are directly concerned by the loss of animals 
and someone even reported that the reason for the 
sharply decreased number of animals in herds No. 4 
and No. 5 in fall 1998 was due to military poaching. 
This loss was so important that the Sovkhoz was 
forced to fusion the two herds in order to obtain the 
planned number of animals for one herd. This auto¬
matically implied a fusion of the two brigades, 
23 









reducing the number of the tundra workers. 
Nevertheless, herders are in rather good relationship 
with the neighbouring military communities 
(Honneland & Jorgensen, 1999). Perceived as aban¬
doned by the state in the same way that herders are 
abandoned by the regional centre, military still enjoy 
a good infrastructure: helicopters, tracked vehicles, 
fuel, and often help herders with transport. In 
absence of the Sovkhoz, the military complex could 
provide a kind of security to the tundra collectives. 
In this way surviving strategies and informal net¬
work interact with the Soviet type of reindeer-herd¬
ing management, and so produce a social syncretism 
in the tundra. This ambiguous position of the rein¬
deer-herding brigade between a formal and an infor¬
mal economy, between old and new actors is repre¬
sented by Fig. 4. 
At the same time both hunters and herders feel 
threatened by the invasion of several large industrial 
enterprises, which are destroying the living resources 
in the tundra. The area is rich with underground 
ores. Almost all towns on the Kola peninsula were 
created during the "industrial colonisation" in the 
1930s. The town of Revda for example was created 
and survived thanks to the rare metals. It developed 
itself around the geological survey base Alluaivstroy, 
transformed into the metallurgical plant Lovozero ore 
mining and processing enterprise. Since the 1930s, it has 
been progressively filled with labour migrants from 
the south working in the mining industry. Even its 
ethnography museum emphasises more the local ores 
than the traditional reindeer herding. In the early 
1990s, while the subsidised industry failed, new 
Fig. 4. The ambiguous position of the rein¬
deer herders between an old and 
"secure" central-planning system and 
new actors in the tundra. The arrows 
follow the way of the reindeer meat 
which go through various economic 
relationships. The meat comes from 
one and same source in the tundra 
but changes its social meaning and 
economic "raison d'être" depending 
of the actors dealing with it. Hence it 
express respectively central-planning 
system, market relationships and 
subsistence economy in the Kola 
peninsula. 
joint-stock mining companies began to 
enter the tundra and became major play¬
ers in the fight for resources This threat is 
perceived as constant in the tundra collec¬
tives and so increase the feeling of "inse¬
curity". Finally, the ideological discourse 
of both herders and hunters in the tundra, directed 
mostly against some centres of power located in the 
town (as Lovozero, Revda, Voronya Minerals Ltd., 
Murmansk, even Moscow), often contributes to 
unify, this time at a political level, otherwise antag¬
onistic tundra actors. 
Looking for solutions 
As the previous two chapters have shown, the com¬
plicated situation with the reindeer husbandry in the 
Kola peninsula results from several interconnected 
issues involving different types of social and eco¬
nomic actors. 
1. There is an urgent need of investments in order 
to (re)create the market for reindeer products: 
meat, antlers, skins. Because of the specific political 
and legislative climate in Russia nowadays, western 
investors are confronted to a "non-favourable" envi¬
ronment: rather reluctant to foreign investors 
(World Bank report, 1996), Russian legislation has 
emphasised the "insider privatisation" by the 
"Workers'-and-managers' collectives". By helping 
the continuity of social relations and maintaining 
collective economic actors this privatisation scheme 
avoids painful social imbalance in remote communi¬
ties. Therefore, for such a collective economic activi¬
ty as the reindeer husbandry it might appear as a 
"good" strategy for many social points of view, 
except for the most important one: the market. 
Indeed, the reindeer husbandry is condemned with¬
out markets for its production. Today, there is no 
internal market for reindeer products. Reindeer meat 
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is practically absent from the formal market in the 
Kola peninsula out of the tundra. After surviving 
exclusively on reindeer meat in the tundra camps, I 
have never seen reindeer meat sold in Revda, 
Kirovsk, Apatity, or Murmansk. Lovozero is maybe 
the only settlement connected to the communication 
system where reindeer meat could be found, because 
of the Sovkhoz "Tundra" and the Swedish slaughter¬
house there. The reasons for this situation are eco¬
nomic (people have no cash for the expensive rein¬
deer meat) and cultural (the great majority of the 
population on the Kola peninsula are labour 
migrants from the south, so they have not habitudes 
to eat reindeer). The situation with other reindeer 
products (antlers, skins) seems to be even worse. 
On the other hand, potential western investors are 
confronted by the recently increasing "anti-western" 
public discourse, especially after NATO's attack on 
Yugoslavia9. Despite all these problems, the Norfrys-
Polarica case shows that foreign investments are pos¬
sible and could work in this complicated system. 
As for relying on local resources for recreating a 
market, this implies a kind of local initiative and 
entrepreneurship of which I have not seen (m)any 
signs so far. Therefore it would not be realistic to rely 
on a private initiative in the short term, but rather 
on more autonomic self-managed collectives based 
on a kinship-like structure and using the infrastruc¬
ture of the former Sovkhoz. I think this is a tenden¬
cy bound to increase when favourable socio-econom¬
ic circumstances will eventually appear. However, 
that higher level of autonomy could not be expected 
before the resolution of the following two points: 
2. Regulation of the indigenous rights of the 
tundra-located people. In my view, there is an urgent 
need of more appropriate regulation of the rights on 
the traditional reindeer-herding territory, actually 
threatened and maltreated by some powerful indus¬
trial enterprises, military and other smaller poachers. 
Even if there is a (blurred) legislation on this matter, 
it doesn't actually work because of the informal char¬
acter of the economic relationships based exclusively 
on barter deals. Corruption in the centres of power 
complicates the situation. According to the rumours 
in the tundra, "the inspectors of hunting and fishing 
are the greatest poachers". Hunting permits are read¬
ily obtained especially for those occupying key-posi¬
tion in administrative centres. As for the industrial 
actors, they usually apply strong lobbying on the 
political powers at regional or central level. In these 
cases, the powerless herding collectives are not able 
to maintain the fight for tundra resources and are 
threatened with the loss of traditional territories for 
reindeer herding. 
Based on the above, I believe that these small and 
remote communities need extensive external assis¬
tance to give them both an effective infrastructure 
and more political power. Only then could one 
expect to see them become real economic actors. In 
that sense, the aboriginal property-rights experience 
from Scandinavian and North American Arctic 
could be useful for the economic development of the 
reindeer husbandry in the region. 
3. Finally, the economic stabilisation of the 
urban centres is of a great importance for the solu¬
tion of the problems in the tundra. As I mentioned 
in the second chapter, the massive loss of jobs after 
1991 in the military complex and in the mining 
industry is the major cause of the poaching problem. 
It involved new actors in the tundra, some of them 
able to threaten whole herd(s) (according to the 
herders). For many of these actors poaching is a sur¬
vival strategy. Therefore it is not expected they could 
change strategies in the present socio-economic con¬
text. Far from favouring the emergency of a market, 
this process only redefines the informal social rela¬
tionships based on barter deals. The paradox is that 
the only imaginable economic growth in the Kola 
peninsula by now is related to the mining industry. 
So the question is: Would an adequate industrial 
revival in the region be able to help the reindeer 
herders in the tundra? 
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